Stable licensing schemes in technology transfer

Shin Kishimoto

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2024, vol. 26, issue 1

Abstract: By considering combinations of a lump‐sum fee and a per‐unit royalty as licensing schemes in the transfer of new technology through licensing from a technology holder to oligopolistic firms, we investigate stable licensing schemes that are realized as bargaining outcomes. The licensing schemes agreeable to both the technology holder and licensees are necessarily rejection‐proof; that is, no subgroup of licensees has an incentive to reject the licensing schemes. We newly define the rejection‐proof core for each group of licensees as the set of rejection‐proof licensing schemes for its group that are not dominated by any other rejection‐proof licensing schemes for any licensees' group. Our principal findings are as follows: For the group of licensees that maximizes the sum of the technology holder's (gross) profit and licensees' total surplus, the rejection‐proof core is always nonempty. Furthermore, from the perspective of profit maximization, the nonempty rejection‐proof cores suggest that the technology holder should license the new technology to such a group.

Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12664

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:26:y:2024:i:1:n:e12664

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1097-3923

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Public Economic Theory is currently edited by Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders

More articles in Journal of Public Economic Theory from Association for Public Economic Theory Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().