Journal of Public Economic Theory

1999 - 2025

Current editor(s): Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders

From Association for Public Economic Theory
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Increasing Returns, Learning, and Beneficial Tax Competition pp. 927-958: Seppo Honkapohja and Arja Turunen‐red
Endogenous City Formation with Production Externalities: Existence of Equilibrium pp. 959-978: Courtney LaFountain
Delegation versus Veto in Organizational Games of Strategic Communication pp. 979-992: Anthony Marino
The Manipulability of Fair Solutions in Assignment of an Indivisible Object with Monetary Transfers pp. 993-1011: Yuji Fujinaka and Toyotaka Sakai
Political Support for Tax Decentralization pp. 1013-1030: Susana Peralta
Policy for Poverty Alleviation and Income Redistribution with Quasi‐Public Goods pp. 1031-1040: Yui Nakamura
Wealth Heterogeneity and Escape from the Poverty–Environment Trap pp. 1041-1068: Masako Ikefuji and Ryo Horii
Extendable Cooperative Games pp. 1069-1078: Yaron Azrieli and Ehud Lehrer
Endogenously Weighted Voting pp. 1079-1102: Nicolas Houy
Inefficient Public Provision in a Repeated Elections Model pp. 1103-1126: Georges Casamatta and Caroline De Paoli

The Methodology of Normative Economics pp. 757-769: Steven E. Landsburg
On Environmental Policy and Permitting pp. 771-792: Philippe Bontems and Jean-Marc Bourgeon
Strategyproof Cost Sharing of Multiple Excludable Public Goods pp. 793-808: Suresh Mutuswami
Rivalry, Exclusion, and Coalitions pp. 809-830: Santiago Sánchez‐pagés
Correcting Market Failure Due to Interdependent Preferences: When Is Piecemeal Policy Possible? pp. 831-866: Emanuela Randon and Peter Simmons
On the Optimality of Search Matching Equilibrium When Workers Are Risk Averse pp. 867-884: Etienne Lehmann and Bruno Van der Linden
Piecemeal Multilateral Environmental Policy Reforms under Asymmetric Oligopoly pp. 885-899: Sajal Lahiri and George Symeonidis
Globalization, Asymmetric Tax Competition, and Fiscal Equalization pp. 901-925: Carl Gaigne and Stephane Riou

Choosing What to Protect: Strategic Defensive Allocation against an Unknown Attacker pp. 563-587: Vicki Bier, Santiago Oliveros and Larry Samuelson
When Redistribution Leads to Regressive Taxation pp. 589-606: Cyril Hariton and Gwenael Piaser
United We Vote pp. 607-639: Jon Eguia
Preemptive Competition in City Development pp. 641-651: Steven Heubeck
Income Taxation with Labor Responses pp. 653-682: Udo Ebert and Patrick Moyes
Poverty‐Reducing and Welfare‐Improving Marginal Public Price and Price Cap Reforms pp. 683-698: Paul Makdissi and Quentin Wodon
Strategic Complementarity in the Dynamic Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good pp. 699-710: Sebastian Kessing
On the Choice of Public Pensions when Income and Life Expectancy Are Correlated pp. 711-725: Rainald Borck
Corruption and the Provision of Public Output in a Hierarchical Asymmetric Information Relationship pp. 727-755: Sanjit Dhami and Ali Al‐nowaihi

Tax Competition Reconsidered pp. 391-423: Amrita Dhillon, Myrna Wooders and Benjamin Zissimos
A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions pp. 425-449: Suman Ghosh, Alexander Karaivanov and Mandar Oak
Lotteries, Group Size, and Public Good Provision pp. 451-465: Paul Pecorino and Akram Temimi
Help the Low Skilled or Let the Hardworking Thrive? A Study of Fairness in Optimal Income Taxation pp. 467-500: Marc Fleurbaey and Francois Maniquet
Economic Progress, Social Regress? pp. 501-519: Amy Farmer and Raja Kali
Racial Profiling, Statistical Discrimination, and the Effect of a Colorblind Policy on the Crime Rate pp. 521-545: David Bjerk
Do Consumers Purchase Too Much Health Insurance? The Role of Market Power in Health‐Care Markets pp. 547-561: Berthold Wigger and Markus Anlauf

On the Neutrality of Redistribution in a General Equilibrium Model with Public Goods pp. 183-200: Antonio Villanacci and Ünal Zenginobuz
Aggregative Public Good Games pp. 201-219: Richard Cornes and Roger Hartley
Government and the Reverse‐Holdup Problem pp. 221-229: Abraham L. Wickelgren
Collective Risk Control and Group Security: The Unexpected Consequences of Differential Risk Aversion pp. 231-263: Toshihiro Ihori and Martin McGuire
The Problem of Optimum Income Taxation: A Remark on Its Monotonicity Constraint pp. 265-283: Xavier Ruiz del Portal
A General‐Equilibrium Analysis of Public Policy for Pharmaceutical Prices pp. 285-318: Christina M. L. Kelton and Robert Rebelein
Majority Voting over Publicly Provided Goods, Redistribution, and Income Taxation pp. 319-334: Stephen Calabrese
Discontinuous Payoffs, Shared Resources, and Games of Fiscal Competition: Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium pp. 335-368: Paul Rothstein
Centralization vs. Decentralization: A Principal‐Agent Analysis pp. 369-389: Mariano Tommasi and Federico Weinschelbaum

On Optimal Commodity Taxes When Consumption Is Time Consuming pp. 1-27: Firouz Gahvari
Asymmetric Equilibria in a Model with Costly Voting pp. 29-40: Francesco De Sinopoli and Giovanna Iannantuoni
Probabilistic Voting and Accountability in Elections with Uncertain Policy Constraints pp. 41-68: Adam Meirowitz
Crime and Punishment and Corruption: Who Needs “Untouchables?” pp. 69-87: Emilson Silva, Charles Kahn and Xie Zhu
The Simple Economics of Bunching: Optimal Taxation with Quasi‐Linear Preferences pp. 89-105: Jan Boone and Lans Bovenberg
Collective Choice and Control Rights in Firms pp. 107-125: Gregory Dow and Gilbert Skillman
Optimum Taxation of Each Year's Income pp. 127-150: Thomas Gaube
Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment: Public versus Private Provision pp. 151-181: Jonathan Thomas and Timothy Worrall