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Discontinuous Payoffs, Shared Resources, and Games of Fiscal Competition: Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium

Paul Rothstein ()

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2007, vol. 9, issue 2, 335-368

Abstract: We define a class of games with discontinuous payoffs that we call shared resource games and establish a pure strategy Nash equilibrium existence theorem for these games. We then apply this result to a canonical game of fiscal competition for mobile capital. Other applications are also discussed. Our result for the mobile capital game holds for any finite number of regions, permits general preferences over private and public goods, and does not assume that production technologies have a particular functional form, or are identical in all regions, or satisfy the Inada condition at zero.

Date: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:9:y:2007:i:2:p:335-368