Tax Competition Reconsidered

Amrita Dhillon (), Myrna Wooders and Benjamin Zissimos

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2007, vol. 9, issue 3, 391-423

Abstract: In a classic model of tax competition, this paper shows that the level of public good provision and taxation in a decentralized equilibrium can be efficient or inefficient with either too much or too little public good provision. The key is whether there exists a unilateral incentive to deviate from the efficient state and, if so, whether this entails raising or lowering taxes. A priori, there is no reason to suppose the incentive is in either one direction or the other.

Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (38)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00312.x

Related works:
Working Paper: Tax Competition Reconsidered (2006)
Working Paper: Tax Competition Reconsidered (2001)
Working Paper: Tax Competition Reconsidered (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:9:y:2007:i:3:p:391-423

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Journal of Public Economic Theory is currently edited by Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders

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