Journal of Public Economic Theory

1999 - 2025

Current editor(s): Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders

From Association for Public Economic Theory
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Government Policy in a Stochastic Growth Model with Elastic Labor Supply pp. 389-433: Stephen J Turnovsky
Optimal Income Taxation With Quasi‐Linear Preferences Revisited pp. 435-460: Robin Boadway, Katherine Cuff and Maurice Marchand
The Effect of Underclass Social Isolation on Schooling Choice pp. 461-482: Peter Streufert
On The Allocative Effects of Rent Seeking pp. 483-491: Luis Corchon
Genetic Algorithms and Public Economics pp. 493-513: Arthur Brooks

Decentralizing Allocation and Distribution by Separation with Information Transfers pp. 289-318: Jonathan Hamilton and Steven Slutsky
Lobby Groups and the Financial Support of Election Campaigns pp. 319-348: M. Socorro Puy
Polarization Orderings and New Classes of Polarization Indices pp. 349-363: You‐Qiang Wang and Kai‐Yuen Tsui
Regulation and Coordination of International Environmental Externalities with Incomplete Information and Costly Public Funds pp. 365-388: Faysal Mansouri and Slim Ben Youssef

Formation of Nations in a Welfare‐State Minded World pp. 157-181: Nir Dagan and Oscar Volij
Pollution Abatement Investment When Environmental Regulation Is Uncertain pp. 183-212: Y. Hossein Farzin and Peter Kort
Optimal Stabilization Policy in the Presence of Learning by Doing pp. 213-241: Philippe Martin and Carol Ann Rogers
Taxpayer Disclosure and Penalty Laws pp. 243-272: Paul J. Beck, Jon S. Davis and Woon‐Oh Jung
Input Substitution and Pollution Control under Uncertainty and Firm Heterogeneity pp. 273-288: JunJie Wu

Social Security, Optimality, and Equilibria in a Stochastic Overlapping Generations Economy pp. 1-23: Gabrielle Demange and Guy Laroque
Pigouvian Taxes in General Equilibrium with a Fixed Tax Redistribution Rule pp. 25-42: Andreas Lange and Till Requate
The Effectiveness of Distributive Policy in a Competitive Economy pp. 43-69: Jean Mercier Ythier
Electoral Systems, Legislative Process, and Income Taxation pp. 71-100: Yan Chen
Insurance Taxation and Insurance Fraud pp. 101-134: M. Martin Boyer
Feasible Net Income Distributions under Income Tax Evasion: An Equilibrium Analysis pp. 135-153: Michael Landsberger, Dov Monderer and Irit Talmor

Collusion‐Proof Samuelson Conditions for Public Goods pp. 399-438: Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort
Tax Amnesties In A Dynamic Model of Tax Evasion pp. 439-463: Inés Macho‐Stadler, Pau Olivella and David Pérez‐Castrillo
A Democracy Principle and Strategy‐Proofness pp. 465-473: Donald E. Campbell and Jerry S. Kelly
Taxing Market Power pp. 475-497: Jean Gabszewicz and Lisa Grazzini
Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness in Public Good Models: An Elementary Proof via Contraction pp. 499-509: Richard Cornes, Roger Hartley and Todd Sandler
User Charges as Redistributive Devices pp. 511-524: Alessandro Balestrino

Information Acquisition and Government Interventon in Credit Markets pp. 283-308: Robin Boadway and Motohiro Sato
The Mordukhovich Normal Cone and the Foundations of Welfare Economics pp. 309-338: M. Khan
Integrating Tax Distortions and Externality Theory pp. 339-358: Charles A. M. De Bartolome
Partial‐Equilibrium Welfare Analysis pp. 359-374: Charles Blackorby
Economies with Multiple Public Projects pp. 375-392: Robert P. Gilles and Kyungdong Hahn
Cost Benefit Analysis with Uncertain Cash Flow and Project Life pp. 393-398: Euston Quah and Khye Chong Tan

Fiscal Policy when Individuals Differ with Regard to Altruism and Labor Supply pp. 187-203: Philippe Michel and Pierre Pestieau
Fiscal Federalism and Capital Accumulation pp. 205-224: Jan Brueckner
Revisiting Externalities pp. 225-245: Leonid Hurwicz
Common Pool Games are Convex Games pp. 247-270: Holger Meinhardt
Pigouvian Taxes: A Strategic Approach pp. 271-281: Jose Alcalde, Luis Corchon and Bernardo Moreno

Public Economic Theory pp. 1-3: John Conley and Myrna Wooders
School Finance Induced Migration and Stratification Patterns: The Impact of Private School Vouchers pp. 5-50: Thomas Nechyba
Uncertainty, Commitment, and Optimal Taxation pp. 51-70: Helmuth Cremer and Firouz Gahvari
Systems of Benevolent Utility Functions pp. 71-100: Ted Bergstrom
Inductive Game Theory: Discrimination and Prejudices pp. 101-137: Mamoru Kaneko and Akihiko Matsui
Economies with Public Goods: An Elementary Geometric Exposition pp. 139-176: William Thomson