Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness in Public Good Models: An Elementary Proof via Contraction

Richard Cornes, Roger Hartley and Todd Sandler

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 1999, vol. 1, issue 4, 499-509

Abstract: This paper presents a proof for existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium of a public good model that exploits a simple contraction mapping. The proof establishes both existence and uniqueness in a single exercise that provides intuition about sufficiency. The method of proof is applied not only to the basic pure public good model but also to the impure model. In the latter model, income normality does not play the same pivotal role for existence and uniqueness.

Date: 1999
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https://doi.org/10.1111/1097-3923.00023

Related works:
Working Paper: Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness in Public Good Models: An Elementary Proof Via Contraction (1999)
Working Paper: Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness in Public Good Models: An Elementary Proof via Contraction (1999)
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