Taxing Market Power

Jean Gabszewicz and Lisa Grazzini

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 1999, vol. 1, issue 4, 475-497

Abstract: We investigate the effectiveness of tax and transfer policies in correcting market distortions when the economy is imperfectly competitive. We perform this analysis in the context of an exchange model representing bilateral oligopoly situations, which constitute particular examples of Shapley–Shubik strategic market games.

Date: 1999
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https://doi.org/10.1111/1097-3923.00022

Related works:
Working Paper: Taxing market power (1999)
Working Paper: Taxing market power (1998)
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