Taxing market power

Jean Gabszewicz and Lisa Grazzini

No 1998048, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We investigate the effectiveness of tax and transfer policies in correcting market distortions when the economy is imperfectly competitive. We perform this analysis in the context of an exchange model representing a bilateral oligopoly situation, which constitutes a particular example of a Shapley-Shubik strategic market game.

Keywords: Imperfect competition; Taxation; Strategic market game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D51 H30 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-09-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Taxing Market Power (1999)
Working Paper: Taxing market power (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1998048

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