A Democracy Principle and Strategy‐Proofness

Donald E. Campbell and Jerry S. Kelly

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 1999, vol. 1, issue 4, 465-473

Abstract: In some social choice applications we want more than one alternative to be selected in some situations. This allows the construction of strategy‐proof social choice rules that are not dictatorial. But if we also require x alone to be selected if it is at the top of some ordering that is submitted by more than half of the individuals then the rule cannot be strategy‐proof. We prove this for rules that sometimes select one alternative, and sometimes two, but never more than two.

Date: 1999
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