Pigouvian Taxes: A Strategic Approach

Jose Alcalde, Luis Corchon and Bernardo Moreno ()

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 1999, vol. 1, issue 2, 271-281

Abstract: This paper analyzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutions in economies with externalities. We provide two simple mechanisms implementing the Pigouvian Social Choice Correspondence in environments in which coalitions can or cannot be formed.

Date: 1999
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https://doi.org/10.1111/1097-3923.00012

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Working Paper: Pigouvian taxes: A strategic approach (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:1:y:1999:i:2:p:271-281

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