Social Security, Optimality, and Equilibria in a Stochastic Overlapping Generations Economy

Gabrielle Demange and Guy Laroque

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2000, vol. 2, issue 1, 1-23

Abstract: Social security institutions implement intergenerational transfers and distribute risks over time. To compare various social security designs, we study an overlapping generations model with demographic shocks. Production takes place through a neoclassical production function subject to productivity shocks. We give a near characterization of optimal allocations. We study rational expectations equilibria when contributions are mandatory, based on labor and capital income. We also describe the equilibria of an economy with a voluntary pay‐as‐you‐go social security fund, and show that they have a long‐run optimality property. An example with Cobb–Douglas production and utility functions illustrates the results.

Date: 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1097-3923.00027

Related works:
Working Paper: Social Security, Optimality and Equilibria in a Stochastic Overlapping Generations Economy (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:2:y:2000:i:1:p:1-23

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1097-3923

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Public Economic Theory is currently edited by Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders

More articles in Journal of Public Economic Theory from Association for Public Economic Theory Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().