Delegation as a Signal: Implicit Communication With Full Cooperation
Joanna Franaszek
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2025, vol. 27, issue 2
Abstract:
I examine the issue of implicit signaling of inexpressible types through delegation in a communication game with perfectly aligned preferences, two‐sided private information, and communication frictions. A principal consults an agent to choose one of two actions. The principal has some tacit knowledge, which he cannot communicate, and may acquire some imperfect, costly signal about the state of the world. After observing the signal, the principal may choose to act or delegate to the agent, who observes the state of the world perfectly. Even if the principal's information acquisition and the signal are unobservable, the delegation, combined with private information, allows the agent to extract some information about the principal's tacit knowledge. I show that for a large class of parameters there exists an equilibrium, in which the agent (upon delegation) can correctly understand “cues” and tailor the action to the principal's needs. In particular, the agent's decision may be non‐monotone in the state of the world.
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70028
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:27:y:2025:i:2:n:e70028
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1097-3923
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Public Economic Theory is currently edited by Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders
More articles in Journal of Public Economic Theory from Association for Public Economic Theory Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().