Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good: When and How Much?

Yunjie Shi, Simona Fabrizi and Steffen Lippert

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2025, vol. 27, issue 3

Abstract: We analyze voluntary public good contributions with incomplete information. A fundraiser chooses whether to disclose or withhold contributions as they occur, and two contributors choose the size and (eventually) the order of their contributions. Contributions made without announcement—thus simultaneous—minimize free‐riding incentives of contributors with low valuations, whereas contributions with disclosure of past donations—thus sequential—minimize those of contributors with high valuations. To maximize aggregate contributions, a fundraiser permits sequential contributions when high valuations are prevalent or significantly exceed low valuations. Otherwise, simultaneous contributions are preferred.

Date: 2025
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https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70042

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:27:y:2025:i:3:n:e70042

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