Deliberation and Voting: A Matter of Truth or Taste

Masayuki Odora

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2025, vol. 27, issue 1

Abstract: This study examines the strategic communication that occurs before voting under various voting rules. A group of imperfectly informed voters communicate before casting their votes in binary elections. The voters have partially conflicting interests: there is a correct candidate in some states of the world, while in others, voters disagree, and ideologies matter. This study demonstrates that truthful communication is never an equilibrium under any voting rule when the size of the electorate is sufficiently large.

Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:27:y:2025:i:1:n:e70013

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