The Repugnant Conclusion and Utilitarianism under Domain Restrictions
Leslie Shiell
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2008, vol. 10, issue 6, 1011-1031
Abstract:
The paper investigates the problem of the repugnant conclusion in variable‐population social choice. A choice rule exhibits the repugnant conclusion if, given any alternative in which all individuals enjoy a high quality of life, there is always a better alternative (according to the choice rule) in which the population is larger and each individual has a life which is barely worth living. While it is well‐known that classical utilitarianism (CU) exhibits the repugnant conclusion on an unrestricted domain, the paper shows that critical‐level utilitarianism (CLU) also exhibits the repugnant conclusion on an unrestricted domain when repugnance is defined in terms of the critical level. In contrast, both CU and CLU are shown to avoid the repugnant conclusion on a restricted domain defined by bounded resources, the law of conservation of matter, concavity and monotonicity of preferences, positive subsistence consumption, and positive “neutral consumption.” In light of the universality of these restrictions, one may conclude that the problem of the repugnant conclusion may not be as great as previously thought.
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00394.x
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:10:y:2008:i:6:p:1011-1031
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1097-3923
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Public Economic Theory is currently edited by Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders
More articles in Journal of Public Economic Theory from Association for Public Economic Theory Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().