Stability of Constitutions

Klaus Kultti () and Paavo Miettinen

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2009, vol. 11, issue 6, 891-896

Abstract: Constitution is a pair of rules (s, S) that are used in a voting situation. The rule s is used to vote about the existing alternatives and the rule S is used to vote about changing the rule s to some other rule s′. We consider what kind of constitutions are likely to emerge as prominent ones if the constitutions contain more than just two rules. In a constitution that contains any number of rules the nth rule is used to decide about the n − 1 th rule. We define a notion of stability for the constitutions and show that all stable constitutions roughly contain the same rule from n = 2 onwards. This is one explanation to the casual observation that the constitutions have usually only two rules.

Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01434.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:11:y:2009:i:6:p:891-896

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1097-3923

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Public Economic Theory is currently edited by Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders

More articles in Journal of Public Economic Theory from Association for Public Economic Theory Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().