The Political Economy of Social Security under Differential Longevity and Voluntary Retirement
Marie-Louise Leroux
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2010, vol. 12, issue 1, 151-170
Abstract:
This paper studies a model where the existence of a pension system is decided by majority voting. We assume that individuals have the same income but different longevity. Retirement is voluntary and the pension system is characterised by a payroll tax on earnings and a flat pension benefit. Individuals vote only on the tax level. We show that a pension system emerges when there is a majority of long‐lived individuals and that voluntary retirement enables to lower the size of the transfers received by the long‐lived. A rise in average longevity will also increase the size of the pension system.
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)
Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01451.x
Related works:
Working Paper: The political economy of social security under differential longevity and voluntary retirement (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:12:y:2010:i:1:p:151-170
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1097-3923
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Public Economic Theory is currently edited by Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders
More articles in Journal of Public Economic Theory from Association for Public Economic Theory Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().