Does Centralization Affect the Number and Size of Lobbies?

Michela Redoano ()

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2010, vol. 12, issue 3, 407-435

Abstract: Previous research has shown that the effect of fiscal centralization is to reduce lobbying. However empirical evidence suggests that this is not always the case. This paper attempts to explain the empirical evidence in a two‐jurisdiction political economy model of endogenous lobby formation and policy determination. We measure lobbying in two ways: (i) the number of lobbies formed under the two settings and (ii) their impact on policy decisions. We show that, contrary to the predictions of the preference dilution effect, the effect of centralization on lobbying are ambiguous with respect to both measures of lobbies.

Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2010.01459.x

Related works:
Working Paper: Does Centralization Affect the Number and Size of Lobbies? (2007)
Working Paper: Does Centralization Affect the Number and Size of Lobbies? (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:12:y:2010:i:3:p:407-435

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