Endogenous Destruction in a Model of Armed Conflict: Implications for Conflict Intensity, Welfare, and Third-Party Intervention
Shane Sanders and
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2014, vol. 16, issue 4, 606-619
This paper employs a contest approach to study a class of territorial conflicts in which conflict-related arming is (endogenously) destructive of the contest prize. Of particular focus is the effect of endogenously destructive conflict arming upon conflict intensity and utility levels among primary parties to conflict. Also of interest are implications of endogenous destruction upon third-party welfare effect in conflict. As compared to the case of a fixed-prize conflict, we find starkly different arming and welfare outcomes in the case of an endogenously destructive conflict. We also find stark differences in third-party effect under this distinct setting.
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