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Optimal Decisions on Pension Plans in the Presence of Information Costs and Financial Literacy

Lorenzo Corsini () and Luca Spataro ()

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 17, issue 3, 383-414

Abstract: Pension reforms are on the political agenda of many countries. Such reforms imply an increasing responsibility on individuals’ side in building an efficient portfolio for retirement. In this paper, we provide a model describing workers’ choices on the allocation of retirement savings in presence of (1) mandatory pension contribution; (2) different pension plans; and (3) information costs and financial literacy investment decisions. In particular, we characterize the results from both a positive and normative standpoint, by highlighting the determinants of individuals’ choice, with special focus on information costs, on the role of income and preferences, and by characterizing the optimal contribution rate to mandatory complementary pension plans. We also introduce endogenous financial literacy and analyze how its optimal level is determined and how it affects the decisions on pension plans.

Date: 2015
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Journal of Public Economic Theory is currently edited by Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders

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