EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Corruption in Committees: An Experimental Study of Information Aggregation through Voting

Amrita Dillon, Rebecca Morton () and Jean-Robert Tyran ()

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 17, issue 4, 553-579

Abstract: We investigate experimentally the effects of corrupt experts on information aggregation in committees. We find that nonexperts are significantly less likely to delegate through abstention when there is a probability that experts are corrupt. Such decreased abstention, when the probability of corrupt experts is low, actually increases information efficiency in committee decision-making. However, if the probability of corrupt experts is large, the effect is not sufficient to offset the mechanical effect of decreased information efficiency due to corrupt experts. Our results demonstrate that the norm of “letting the expert decide” in committee voting is influenced by the probability of corrupt experts, and that influence can have, to a limited extent, a positive effect on information efficiency.

Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/jpet.12153 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Corruption in Committees: An Experimental Study of Information Aggregation through Voting (2014) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:17:y:2015:i:4:p:553-579

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1097-3923

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Public Economic Theory is currently edited by Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders

More articles in Journal of Public Economic Theory from Association for Public Economic Theory Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

 
Page updated 2020-02-12
Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:17:y:2015:i:4:p:553-579