Economics at your fingertips  

Legalization of Bribe Giving when Bribe Type Is Endogenous

Amrita Dillon and Mandar Oak ()

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 17, issue 4, 580-604

Abstract: A recent paper, Basu argues that for a class of bribes, called harassment bribes, legalization of bribe giving, but not bribe taking, will reduce bribery. We examine the applicability of Basu's insight in an environment in which the type of the bribe—harassment or nonharassment—is endogenously determined, and it is not feasible to legalize the giving of nonharassment bribes. We find that in such an environment Basu's proposal, in and of itself, yields mixed results: in one case it reduces even the prevalence of nonharassment bribes, and improves social welfare. However, in another case it is shown to be counter-productive, i.e., it reduces social welfare while failing to eliminate bribery. Our analysis finds parameter values that determine which of the two cases will prevail, and points to additional policies aimed at strengthening the legal institutions which, in conjunction with Basu's proposal, will help reduce bribery.

Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Legalization of Bribe Giving when Bribe Type is Endogenous (2013) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1097-3923

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Public Economic Theory is currently edited by Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders

More articles in Journal of Public Economic Theory from Association for Public Economic Theory Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

Page updated 2020-03-29
Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:17:y:2015:i:4:p:580-604