Securely implementable social choice functions in divisible and nonexcludable public good economies with quasi‐linear utility functions

Katsuhiko Nishizaki

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2018, vol. 20, issue 3, 424-436

Abstract: This paper studies the possibility of secure implementation (Saijo et al., 2007) in divisible and nonexcludable public good economies with quasi‐linear utility functions. In these economies, although Saijo et al. (2007) showed that the Groves mechanisms (Groves, 1973) are securely implementable when the valuation functions of the public good are (i) differentiable, concave, and (ii) identified with a real number, respectively, this paper shows the following negative result: securely implementable social choice functions are dictatorial or constant when the valuation functions of the public good are strictly increasing and strictly concave.

Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:20:y:2018:i:3:p:424-436

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