Taking on the boss: Informative contests in prosecutor elections

Bryan McCannon and Joylynn Pruitt

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2018, vol. 20, issue 5, 657-671

Abstract: The United States is unique in that most states select their prosecutors using popular election. An interesting feature of prosecutor elections is that the pool of potential challengers to an incumbent comes primarily from subordinates within the office. We develop a signaling model that analyzes whether entry into the political race by a subordinate provides voters with useful information. We challenge the commonly held presumption that the election mechanism is ineffective. Exploring the decision of an insider to challenge the boss, we demonstrate that a challenger can strategically convey information about the incumbent's quality by entering the race. Anticipating this, poor incumbents exit. Thus, the model matches empirical observations of rare contested elections and rather modest vacancy rates. Compared to the situation where outsiders challenge the incumbent, the election mechanism is effective.

Date: 2018
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