Legal institution and the evolution of moral conduct

Jon C. Thompson and Jiabin Wu ()

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2018, vol. 20, issue 5, 725-741

Abstract: This paper argues that to better understand the relationship between a legal institution and moral conduct, two features of the legal institution need to be jointly considered: It is costly and endogenously determined. We propose a simple cultural transmission model in the context of a legal institution. The strength of the legal institution is determined by majority voting and the cost of implementing the legal institution is shared by the citizens. We find that the legal institution can either “crowd in” or “crowd out” moral conduct in the long run depending on the cost of implementation as well as the initial distribution of moral conduct in a society.

Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:20:y:2018:i:5:p:725-741

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