On the role of the exclusionary rule for optimal law enforcement effort

Tim Friehe and Thomas J. Miceli

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2018, vol. 20, issue 5, 757-767

Abstract: This article explores the role of the exclusionary rule for improving the level of law enforcement. In a setup in which the enforcement authority and the offender choose effort levels in a struggle to influence the probability of detection, exclusion of excessive evidence can be welfare‐improving because it allows the social planner to commit to low enforcement effort.

Date: 2018
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