Lotteries and Lindahl prices in public good provision

Jörg Franke and Wolfgang Leininger

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2018, vol. 20, issue 6, 840-848

Abstract: Lotteries are traditional instruments for fundraising in general. Morgan has shown that they can also be very effective in the provision of a public good. However, a fair lottery can only enhance provision but never result in the efficient amount. Franke and Leininger show how—by borrowing from optimal contest theory—biased lotteries can provide the efficient amount of the public good. This paper aligns this result with standard public good theory, in particular the classic notion of Lindahl pricing. It shows that biased lotteries can—implicitly—implement Lindahl pricing of the public good in noncooperative Nash equilibrium.

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12307

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:20:y:2018:i:6:p:840-848

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1097-3923

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Public Economic Theory is currently edited by Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders

More articles in Journal of Public Economic Theory from Association for Public Economic Theory Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().