Commuting in Happyville: Taxation with interjurisdictional commuting and pollution
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2019, vol. 21, issue 2, 201-218
This paper presents a spatial model of tax competition in an asymmetric duocentric city with traffic‐related pollution. Jurisdictions differ in productivity and both wage or commuting and head taxes are applied. Residential location is given, but agents can choose their workplace. We show that the incentive for the high productive jurisdiction to export the tax burden by attracting cross‐commuters is reduced by the resulting pollution import; this affects the welfare impacts of tax competition. The possibility that households may misperceive their exposure to pollution is explored and its impact of fiscal competition is analyzed. When households are very optimistic about their exposure, aggregate welfare may be higher than in the first best.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:21:y:2019:i:2:p:201-218
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Journal of Public Economic Theory is currently edited by Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders
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