Intragroup competition in public good games: The role of relative performance incentives and risk attitudes

Annarita Colasante (colasante.a84@gmail.com), Aurora García‐Gallego, Nikolaos Georgantzís (nikolaos.georgantzis@bsb-education.com), Andrea Morone and Tiziana Temerario
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Aurora García-Gallego

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2019, vol. 21, issue 5, 847-865

Abstract: We analyze a public good game (PGG) with intragroup competition in which, generally but not always, the dominant strategy is to not contribute; therefore, free riding is the unique Nash equilibrium, not achieving Pareto efficiency. We propose a PGG setup where subjects' contributions are rewarded with different individual returns following a rank‐order voluntary contribution mechanism. It is found that the resulting competition for a better return significantly increases contributions. This effect is sensitive to the salience of return differences rewarding higher contributions. Furthermore, the positive effect of return differences on contribution levels depends on an individual's return‐to‐risk sensitivity as elicited through an independent risk elicitation task.

Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12369

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:21:y:2019:i:5:p:847-865

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1097-3923

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Public Economic Theory is currently edited by Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders

More articles in Journal of Public Economic Theory from Association for Public Economic Theory Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery (contentdelivery@wiley.com).