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Regulation and altruism

Izabela Jelovac () and Samuel Kembou Nzale

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2020, vol. 22, issue 1, 49-68

Abstract: We study optimal contracts in a regulator–agent setting with joint production, altruistic and selfish agents, limited liability, and uneasy outcome measurement. Such a setting represents sectors of activities such as education and healthcare provision. The agents and the regulator jointly produce an outcome for which they all care to some extent that is varying from agent to agent. Some agents, the altruistic ones, care more than the regulator does while others, the selfish agents, care less. Moral hazard is present due to both the agent's effort and the joint outcome that are not contractible. Adverse selection is present too since the regulator cannot a priori distinguish between altruistic and selfish agents. Contracts consist of a simple transfer from the regulator to the agents together with the regulator's input in the joint production. We show that, under the conditions of our setting and when we face both moral hazard and adverse selection, the regulator maximizes welfare with a menu of contracts, which specify higher transfers for the altruistic agents and higher regulator's inputs for the selfish agents.

Date: 2020
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https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12368

Related works:
Working Paper: Regulation and altruism (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: Regulation and Altruism (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Regulation and altruism (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Regulation and Altruism (2017) Downloads
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Journal of Public Economic Theory is currently edited by Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders

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