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Charitable asymmetric bidders

Olivier Bos

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2020, vol. 22, issue 2, 320-337

Abstract: Recent papers show that the all‐pay auction is better at raising money for charity than the first‐price auction with symmetric bidders under incomplete information. Yet, this result is lost with sufficiently asymmetric bidders under complete information. In this paper, we consider a framework on charity auctions with asymmetric bidders under some incomplete information. We find that the all‐pay auction still raises more money than the first‐price auction. Thus, the all‐pay auction should be seriously considered when one wants to organize a charity auction.

Date: 2020
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Working Paper: Charitable asymmetric bidders (2011) Downloads
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Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:22:y:2020:i:2:p:320-337