A demand‐induced overtreatment model with heterogeneous experts

Bertrand Crettez, Regis Deloche () and Marie‐Hélène Jeanneret‐Crettez

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2020, vol. 22, issue 5, 1713-1733

Abstract: We propose an original game‐theoretic demand‐induced supply model of overtreatment with heterogeneous experts. We show that experts, whatever their abilities, must give the treatment if customers expect them to do so. We show how launching awareness campaigns (on the prudent use of treatment) disseminating information to both the general public and prescribers may, by undermining customers' expectations, reduce overtreatment. Introducing a diagnostic test may have the same effect, but not if its use is costly, especially for good experts. We rely on our model to account for antibiotics overprescription.

Date: 2020
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