On the core of economies with multilateral environmental externalities

Giorgos Stamatopoulos ()

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2021, vol. 23, issue 1, 158-171

Abstract: We revisit the cooperative model of coalition formation in economies with environmental externalities. Motivated by recent concerns over the true behavior and incentives of key players in international negotiations over the climate and the environment, we construct a cooperative game where the members of each coalition have uncertainty over the behavior of the nonmembers, and in particular they face uncertainty over their coalition structure. As a result, a coalition assigns various probability distributions over the set of partitions the outsiders can form. We compute the payoff of each coalition under this assumption and we derive conditions under which the core of the induced cooperative game is nonempty.

Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12479

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:23:y:2021:i:1:p:158-171

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1097-3923

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Public Economic Theory is currently edited by Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders

More articles in Journal of Public Economic Theory from Association for Public Economic Theory Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().