On the Neutrality of Profit Taxation in a Mixed Oligopoly

Horn‐In Kuo, Cheng-Hau Peng () and K. L. Glen Ueng

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2021, vol. 23, issue 5, 1012-1021

Abstract: This paper investigates the neutrality of profit taxation in a mixed oligopoly where one (partially) public firm competes with private firms. We find that the neutrality of a profit tax is robust under a general cost and a general demand function as long as the degree of privatization is endogenously determined. This result is also true when product heterogeneity is considered under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. By contrast, if the degree of privatization is exogenously given, the profit tax neutrality holds only in the cases where the public firm is fully privatized or fully state‐owned; otherwise, the neutrality breaks down.

Date: 2021
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