The double dividend of relative auditing—Theory and experiments on corporate tax enforcement

Ralph-C Bayer ()

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2022, vol. 24, issue 6, 1433-1462

Abstract: In this paper, we present and extend previous theoretical results that show that tax authorities can at the same time reduce tax evasion and boost output with clever audit behavior. We argue that randomized controlled trials or field experiments are impractical for empirical testing in this context. Instead, we turn to laboratory experiments and test if humans follow the theoretical mechanisms underlying the theory. We find that both dividends, less evasion, and higher output, materialize in the laboratory. We show in additional experiments that the behavioral mechanism generating the higher output differs from the theoretical driver.

Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12587

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:24:y:2022:i:6:p:1433-1462

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1097-3923

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Public Economic Theory is currently edited by Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders

More articles in Journal of Public Economic Theory from Association for Public Economic Theory Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().