An Economic Model of the French Revolution

Kishore Gawande and Benjamin Zissimos

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2025, vol. 27, issue 5

Abstract: We offer a new economic perspective on the French Revolution by analyzing how an elite commitment problem and trade policy shaped revolutionary dynamics. We develop a complete‐information game‐theoretic model in which revolution can occur on the equilibrium path. By formalizing the interaction between democratization and trade policy, our model explains when revolution may occur with some probability. Unlike models with incomplete information, where revolutions may be mistakes, our approach shows that revolution occurs only when it is beneficial for the rest of society. Paradoxically, we show that revolution could occur only because there was sufficient trust in the Ancien Régime.

Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:27:y:2025:i:5:n:e70057

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