Lobbying as a Signal

Artyom Jelnov and Doron Klunover

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2025, vol. 27, issue 5

Abstract: A model of political competition is considered, in which a candidate who will provide favors to a lobbyist in exchange for a campaign donation, may be perceived as more competent than a rival candidate who has not received a donation and therefore will work solely on behalf of the public. We characterize the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the game and show that: (i) the lobbyist is able to exploit the political system to serve his own interests, although lobbying may benefit voters as well; and (ii) donating to both candidates—which is frequently observed in political campaigns—is possible only under competition among lobbyists or under asymmetric information regarding voters' preferences.

Date: 2025
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https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70071

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:27:y:2025:i:5:n:e70071

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