Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules

Lars Ehlers and Bettina Klaus ()

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2001, vol. 3, issue 2, 167-184

Abstract: We consider a probabilistic approach to collective choice problems where a group of agents with single‐peaked preferences have to decide on the level or location of a public good. We show that every probabilistic rule that satisfies Pareto efficiency and “solidarity” (population‐monotonicity or replacement‐domination) must equal a so‐called target rule.

Date: 2001
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