Stable Provision vs. Cournot–Nash Equilibria in Pure Public Good Economies

Benyamin Shitovitz and Menahem Spiegel

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2001, vol. 3, issue 2, 219-224

Abstract: Shitovitz and Spiegel (1998, Journal of Economic Theory83, pp. 1–18) demonstrated that in pure public good economies, for some consumers the Lindahl consumption bundles can be inferior (utility‐wise) to their Cournot–Nash allocation. In this paper, we prove that in any finite pure public good economy there exists a core allocation that is unanimously preferred, utility‐wise, by all consumers over their Cournot–Nash consumption bundles.

Date: 2001
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