On Social Transfers and Income Taxation
Achim Wambach ()
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2001, vol. 3, issue 3, 295-307
In this paper we provide a different rationale for the use of social transfers. It is assumed that the government is unable to condition the (possibly nonlinear) income tax scheme on the productivity and the endowment of the citizens. However, people applying for social benefit have to demonstrate their financial assets, which is costly for the government to verify. We show that under weak conditions the government will prefer to provide social transfers that induce some voluntary unemployment to reduce the informational rent the highly productive and/or rich types obtain. Copyright 2001 by Blackwell Publishing Inc.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent ... &year=2001&part=null link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:3:y:2001:i:3:p:295-307
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1097-3923
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Public Economic Theory is currently edited by Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders
More articles in Journal of Public Economic Theory from Association for Public Economic Theory Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().