Composition of Government Budget, Non‐Single Peakedness, and Majority Voting

Peter Bearse, Gerhard Glomm and Eckhard Janeba

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2001, vol. 3, issue 4, 471-481

Abstract: In this paper we study whether majority voting equilibria exist when preferences over public policies are not single peaked. The government levies a proportional income tax. Tax revenue is used to finance a uniform lump‐sum transfer and public education. Individuals vote on the composition of the government budget. We show that the single‐crossing property cannot be invoked to establish existence of a majority voting equilibrium. In a simple parametric example we find that cycles are pervasive.

Date: 2001
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