A “Tragedy of the Clubs”: Excess Entry in Exclusive Coalitions

Paola Manzini and Marco Mariotti

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2002, vol. 4, issue 1, 115-136

Abstract: We model club formation as a noncooperative game of coalition formation and surplus division. We show how social norms and individual rationality sustain a particular type of collective inefficiency, namely, excessive entry in the joint production and exploitation of an excludable good. We term this phenomenon the “tragedy of the clubs.” The tragedy of the clubs is a pervasive equilibrium phenomenon.

Date: 2002
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https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9779.00091

Related works:
Working Paper: A Tragedy Of The Clubs: Excess Entry in Exclusive Coalitions (1998)
Working Paper: A Tragedy Of The Clubs: Excess Entry in Exclusive Coalitions (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:4:y:2002:i:1:p:115-136

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