Policy Reversals and Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Parties

Cesar Martinelli and Akihiko Matsui ()

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2002, vol. 4, issue 1, 39-61

Abstract: We develop a spatial model of competition between two policy‐motivated parties. The parties know which policies are desirable for voters, while voters do not. The announced positions of the parties serve as signals to the voters concerning the parties’ private information. In all separating equilibria, when the left‐wing party attains power, the policies it implements are to the right of the policies implemented by the right‐wing party when it attains power. Intuitively, when right‐wing policies become more attractive, the left party moves toward the right in order to be assured of winning, while the right‐wing party stays put in a radical stance.

Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9779.00087

Related works:
Working Paper: Policy Reversals and Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Parties (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:4:y:2002:i:1:p:39-61

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1097-3923

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Public Economic Theory is currently edited by Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders

More articles in Journal of Public Economic Theory from Association for Public Economic Theory Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().