An Allocation Rule with Wealth-Regressive Tax Rates
Remzi Sanver ()
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2002, vol. 4, issue 1, 63-69
We introduce a public good allocation rule whose direct implementation by asking agents their endowments leads to Nash equilibrium outcomes--always Pareto dominating voluntary contributions outcomes. Although the Nash equilibrium allocations induced by this rule are not Pareto optimal in general, they are so in two-person economies. Copyright 2002 by Blackwell Publishing Inc.
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