A Remark on Voters’ Rationality in a Model of Representative Democracy

Francesco De sinopoli and Alessandro Turrini

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2002, vol. 4, issue 2, 163-170

Abstract: Voting games are characterized by the emergence of dominated strategies, that would be iteratively deleted by rational players. In this note we show, via an example, how applying iterated dominance restricts the set of equilibrium outcomes in Besley and Coate’s (1997) citizen‐candidate model of representative democracy.

Date: 2002
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https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9779.00093

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Working Paper: A remark on voters' rationality in a model of representative democracy (2002)
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