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Tactical Redistribution Between Regions When Parties and Voters Care About Ideology

Eva Johansson ()
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Eva Johansson: Uppsala University

Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Eva Mörk ()

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2003, vol. 5, issue 1, 95-120

Abstract: In this paper, redistributive transfers between regions are examined in a political economy model where both parties and voters are led by selfish as well as ideological motives, the latter taking the form of egalitarian objectives. Parties announce election platforms about how to distribute funds between regions and different income types, and voters react to these platforms when casting their vote. It is found that regional transfers are completely tactical; it is the political power of a region that decides if it will be a receiver or a contributor. Ideological goals are reached by redistributive transfers between different income types. Copyright 2003 Blackwell Publishing, Inc..

Date: 2003
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