Symmetric Tax Competition under Formula Apportionment

Wolfgang Eggert and Guttorm Schjelderup

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2003, vol. 5, issue 2, 439-446

Abstract: This paper compares property taxation to a corporate income tax based on formula apportionment in a model where identical countries compete to attract capital. We find that if countries can pair a residence–based capital tax with a property tax (source tax on capital) the tax equilibrium is efficient. In contrast, the use of a 2–factor FA scheme based on sales and capital combined with a residence–based capital tax leads to an inefficient outcome.

Date: 2003
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9779.00141

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:5:y:2003:i:2:p:439-446

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1097-3923

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Public Economic Theory is currently edited by Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders

More articles in Journal of Public Economic Theory from Association for Public Economic Theory Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().