Investment in Human Capital in Team Members Who Are Involved in Collective Decision Making
Ruth Ben-Yashar and
Additional contact information
Ruth Ben-Yashar: Bar-Ilan University
Jacob Paroush: Bar-Ilan University
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2003, vol. 5, issue 3, 527-539
This paper studies an investment policy which improves the ability of team members to decide correctly. We specify sufficient conditions on the learning function such that the best policy of investment in human capital is to invest first in the least competent person. Despite the fact that team members who are endowed with more human capital contribute more to the probability that the whole team would decide correctly, the liberal policy is still optimal under these conditions. Moreover, within the dichotomous model of collective decision-making, we show that these conditions are not so stringent. Copyright 2003 Blackwell Publishing Inc..
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent ... &year=2003&part=null link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:5:y:2003:i:3:p:527-539
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1097-3923
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Public Economic Theory is currently edited by Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders
More articles in Journal of Public Economic Theory from Association for Public Economic Theory Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().