On the Popular Support for Progressive Taxation
Esteban Klor ()
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2003, vol. 5, issue 4, 593-604
The "popular support for progressive taxation theorem" ( Marhuenda and OrtuÒo-OrtÌn, 1995) provides an important formalization of the intuition that a majority of relatively poor voters over rich ones leads to progressive income taxation. Yet the theorem does not provide an equilibrium outcome. In addition, it assumes an overly restrictive domain of tax schedules and no incentive effects of income taxation. This paper shows that none of these assumptions of the theorem can be relaxed completely. Most notably, it is shown that a majority of poor voters does not imply progressive taxation in a more general policy space and that a regressive tax schedule may obtain a majority over a progressive one when individuals' income is endogenous. Copyright 2003 Blackwell Publishing Inc..
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent ... &year=2003&part=null link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:5:y:2003:i:4:p:593-604
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1097-3923
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Public Economic Theory is currently edited by Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders
More articles in Journal of Public Economic Theory from Association for Public Economic Theory Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().