A Note on the Poll Tax

Thorsten Clausing

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2003, vol. 5, issue 4, 623-627

Abstract: A poll tax is usually seen as the standard example of a lump sum tax and therefore as allocationally efficient. In this paper, it is shown that in a dynamic setting with endogenous fertility, a poll tax may yield a Pareto‐inferior outcome as compared to a percentage consumption tax.

Date: 2003
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